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KNOW?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MENS REA
REQUIREMENT OF 21 U.S.C. § 841(C)(2)
KIRSTEN ENNIS†
INTRODUCTION
The average American is undoubtedly familiar with the
decongestant Sudafed. Often employed to treat symptoms of the
common cold and allergies, Sudafed is a household name. When
most people purchase Sudafed at their local drug store, however,
they are often unaware that their fellow customers may not be
buying the medicine to nurse their cold symptoms. In fact, many
are not aware of the black market that exists for Sudafed. The
active ingredient in Sudafed, pseudoephedrine, is used in the
manufacturing of methamphetamine, a highly addictive, illegal
stimulant that typically causes neurological damage in its users.1
Methamphetamine producers often purchase bulk quantities of
pseudoephedrine, and the DEA is currently unaware of any other
legitimate or black market use for large amounts of
pseudoephedrine.2 To ensure that lawful chemicals that are
readily available, such as pseudoephedrine, are not diverted into
illegal channels such as methamphetamine production, Congress
enacted 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).
This statute criminalizes the
possession or distribution of certain chemicals when the
defendant knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that such
chemicals would be used to manufacture a controlled substance.3

†
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John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Binghamton University. The author
thanks Professor Elaine Chiu for her help and guidance.
1
See United States v. Khattab, 536 F.3d 765, 766 (7th Cir. 2008).
2
See id. at 767.
3
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2) (West 2011); infra Part I.C (describing the history
and purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “controlled
substance” as “[a]ny type of drug whose possession and use is regulated by law,
including a narcotic, a stimulant, or a hallucinogen.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 378–
79 (9th ed. 2009).
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A well-established maxim in criminal law is actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea, “an act does not make [its doer] guilty,
unless the mind be guilty.”4 It is axiomatic in American criminal
jurisprudence that punishment is proper only when an individual
has committed the physical act and had the mental state
required by the statute defining the crime.5 Certain crimes
require that the defendant intended the result of his physical act,
predicating conviction on the defendant’s subjective, or actual,
objectives.6 Other crimes, however, focus on the mindset of the
reasonable person in the defendant’s situation, allowing the
prosecution to prove guilt based upon objective knowledge.7
When drafting statutes, Congress often includes more than one
requisite mental state, or mens rea; in such a case, a defendant
may be found guilty if he possessed either of the named mentes
reae.8
Title 21, section 841(c)(2) is one such statute,
criminalizing the possession or distribution of certain chemicals
when the defendant knew, or had reasonable cause to believe,
that the chemicals would be used to manufacture a controlled
substance.9 Black market sellers of pseudoephedrine, or other
chemicals used to make controlled substances, can be convicted of

4
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (6th ed. 1990); see also, e.g., Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will
and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose
between good and evil.
Id.
5
See id. at 251–52 (noting that criminal convictions are predicated on a
defendant’s physical actions coupled with his mental thoughts).
6
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 155 (5th ed.
2009) (explaining that for the crimes of battery and murder, the prosecution must
prove “the conscious object of the actor”).
7
See id. at 275 (“The ‘reasonable man’ (or, sometimes, ‘ordinary man’) shows up
throughout the criminal law and represents an objective standard by which the
defendant’s conduct is measured.”).
8
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 844(a) (West 2011) (“It shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance . . . .”);
18 U.S.C. § 1111(c)(3) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘child abuse’ means intentionally or
knowingly causing death or serious bodily injury to a child.”); 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a)
(2006) (“[A]ny officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service” violates the
statute if he or she “recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of negligence[,]
disregards any provision of this title.”).
9
21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2). For the definition of “controlled substance,” see supra
note 3.
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violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) if they do so knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe that their purchasers will use the
chemicals to produce a controlled substance.10
To answer the question of whether a particular defendant
violated 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), a court must ascertain the
meaning of the requisite mens rea: “knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe.”
Specifically, the court must
determine whether this phrase implicates an entirely subjective
standard or, instead, allows a defendant’s conviction to be based
on either subjective or objective knowledge of his purchaser’s
intent. This decision is often crucial in whether a defendant is
found guilty, as a defendant who only possessed objective
knowledge would be innocent in a jurisdiction that adopts a
wholly subjective standard; the same defendant, however, would
be convicted in a court that holds that guilt may be predicated on
objective fault.11 Currently, the circuit courts have failed to
adopt a uniform understanding of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)’s mens
rea.12 A consistent interpretation is needed to ensure that a
defendant’s guilt or innocence is not determined simply by the
court in which he is tried.
The varying interpretations of the mens rea of
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) have been at issue in the circuit courts for a
number of years. While one circuit has held that the standard is
wholly subjective, others have ruled that the statute’s language
allows for either a subjective or objective finding of knowledge on
the part of the defendant, and one circuit has failed to adopt a
conclusive stance on the issue.13 This Note explores these
conflicting interpretations of the mens rea requirement of
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)
and
advocates
for
a
mixed
subjective/objective standard. Part I describes the history and
purpose of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and

10

See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2).
Compare United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 1290 (10th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that while a reasonable person would have been aware that the
defendant’s purchasers planned to use the pseudoephedrine to produce
methamphetamine, the defendant did not have actual knowledge of their plan and
thus, was innocent), with United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a defendant’s objective knowledge is sufficient to prove his guilt).
12
See United States v. Khattab, 536 F.3d 765, 768–69 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting
that the circuit courts are split regarding the appropriate interpretation of “knowing
or having reasonable cause to believe”).
13
See infra Part II.
11
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Control Act and specifically, the current language of
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)’s requisite mens rea. Part II discusses the
competing interpretations of “knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe” in the circuit courts. Finally, Part III argues
that the correct view is an interpretation that is both subjective
and objective.
It examines various tools of statutory
interpretation, including legislative history, the maxim that a
statute should be interpreted to give each word or phrase a
distinct meaning, and the “mischief approach” to statutory
construction.
I.

HISTORY AND PURPOSE

This Part explains how and why 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was
enacted. Section A describes the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, the first piece of legislation
passed to suppress the drug problem in the United States and its
relationship to 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). Section B discusses the
Controlled
Substances
Act,
the
Act
under
which
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was eventually adopted. Finally, Section C
explains the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the legislation that
authorized the enactment of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).
A.

History and Purpose of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act

In 1969, President Richard Nixon announced that drug
abuse posed a substantial threat to the safety of the United
States.14 He emphasized that drug use had soared to an
unprecedented high and urged that comprehensive legislation be
enacted to quell the problem.15 Two years later, he declared a
national “War on Drugs,”16 calling drug abuse in America “public

14
See NPR.org, Timeline: America’s War on Drugs, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Apr. 2,
2007
[hereinafter
Timeline],
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=9252490 (providing a timeline of America’s fight against drugs over the
past four decades).
15
See id. (noting that between 1960 and 1967, the United States experienced a
substantial rise in drug-related crimes).
16
See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005) (explaining that President Nixon
declared the “War on Drugs” two years after taking office in 1969); Timeline, supra
note 14. Essentially, the “War on Drugs” was an attempt by the United States
government to stop drug production, distribution, and consumption in America by
imposing harsh penalties for those who engaged in drug-related activities. See
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enemy No. 1.”17 Citing the alarming levels of illegal drug
manufacturing, use, and trafficking, President Nixon warned
that drugs were ravaging the security and morale of society.18
The resulting legislation was the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (“CDAPCA”).19 As the
Supreme Court recently noted, “Congress set out to enact
legislation that would consolidate various drug laws . . . into a
comprehensive statute, provide meaningful regulation over
legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal
channels, and strengthen law enforcement tools against the
traffic in illicit drugs.”20 The Act is divided into three distinct
sections, called “Titles.”21 Title I regulates preventive and
therapeutic treatment for narcotics addicts via the Department of
Health and Human Services,22 Title II criminalizes the
possession and distribution of precursor chemicals to illicit drugs,
as well as the manufacture of illegal substances,23 and Title III
relates to the importation and exportation of controlled
substances.24 Since 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was enacted under Title
II, this Note will focus primarily on that Title.

James A. Inciardi, American Drug Policy: The Continuing Debate, in THE DRUG
LEGALIZATION DEBATE 4–5 (James A. Inciardi ed., 2d ed. 1999).
17
Timeline, supra note 14.
18
See David T. Courtwright, The Controlled Substances Act: How a “Big Tent”
Reform Became a Punitive Drug Law, 76 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 9, 11
(2004).
19
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
21 U.S.C.); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 10 (referring to the CDAPCA as “the first
campaign” of the “War on Drugs”); Edward J. Perez et al., Substance Abuse in
America: Then and Now, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 365, 372 (2009) (noting that in
1970, Congress repealed then-existing drug laws and substituted them with the
CDAPCA).
20
Raich, 545 U.S. at 10; see also Perez et al., supra note 19 (commenting that
the CDAPCA was enacted to suppress the drug problem in the United States).
21
See 84 Stat. at 1238, 1242, 1285; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 12 n.19 (noting
that the Act is comprised of three separate titles).
22
See 84 Stat. at 1238.
23
See id. at 1264. A “precursor chemical” is a chemical used in the production of
a certain drug. Lauren Grau, Cutting Off the Building Blocks to Methamphetamine
Production: A Global Solution to Methamphetamine Abuse, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 157,
160 (2007).
24
See 84 Stat. at 1285.
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History and Purpose of the Controlled Substances Act

Title II of the CDAPCA is also known as the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”).25 The CSA was enacted to tighten the
government’s regulatory authority over the nation’s drug supply,
both legal and illegal,26 in an attempt to suppress the drug
problem in America.27 The Act empowers the Attorney General
and Drug Enforcement Administration to manage and oversee
drug control and enforcement.28
Most notably, the CSA heavily regulates precursor chemicals
that, while legal, are often used to produce illegitimate controlled
substances.29 To halt the detrimental impact that narcotics were
having on America’s well-being, Congress recognized the need to
stop all transactions through which legal drugs were diverted to
illegal distribution chains and used to manufacture controlled
substances.30 Congress further explained that this goal could
only be accomplished by reducing the availability of legal,
precursor chemicals and in turn, adopted a “closed” regulatory
scheme.31 In this “closed” scheme, the government controlled the
production, sale, and use of narcotics and forbade anyone from
engaging in such activities unless sanctioned by the CSA.32
Congress divided a myriad of controlled substances into five
different schedules; this division has been referred to as the
“centerpiece” of the CSA.33 A substance was placed in a certain
schedule after its safety and acceptability for use in medical
treatment, potential for abuse, and psychological and physical

25
Id. at 1242 (1970). A “legal drug” is one that may lawfully be possessed and
sold, as long as “the appropriate license is obtained from the DEA, and applicable
regulations are followed.” United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1263 n.1 (10th Cir.
2000).
26
See Joseph F. Spillane, Debating the Controlled Substances Act, 76 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 17, 17 (2004) (noting that the CSA provided the federal
government with the authority to regulate numerous drugs).
27
See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005) (identifying one of the main
objectives of the CSA as “conquer[ing] drug abuse”).
28
Id. at 12 n.19.
29
Id. at 12–13 (explaining that “Congress was particularly concerned with the
need to prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels”).
30
See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, at 71–72 (1970).
31
Id.
32
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 13 (citing 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a) (West 2011)).
33
Perez et al., supra note 19. Congress defines a “controlled substance” as “a
drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV,
or V.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2006 & Supp. II).
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effects were determined.34 The CSA provides that new drugs
may be added or removed from a schedule and drugs may be
rescheduled after the Attorney General consults with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services.35
C.

History and Purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)

1.

The 1988 Amendment

Under the Reagan administration, Congress amended Title
II of the CSA via the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, thereby
enacting 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). The Act was passed to further
inhibit the production, distribution, and use of illicit drugs.36 In
his remarks on signing the bill, President Reagan explained that
the Act would help the government to “close rank” on those who
played a role in the manufacturing and distribution of drugs.37
President Reagan further noted that the Act gave “a new sword
and shield” to law enforcement officials by tightening regulations
regarding drug-related offenses.38 The bill, referred to as “the
most comprehensive Anti-Drug Abuse Act ever considered in the
U.S. Congress” by Senator Byrd,39 sent a crystal clear message to
34
Raich, 545 U.S. at 13. Schedule I drugs are characterized by having a high
chance of abuse, having no recognized medical purpose, and being unsafe for use in
medical treatments. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242,
1247 (1970). Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, more commonly referred to as
“MDMA” or ecstasy, is a schedule I substance. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL,
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LISTS OF: SCHEDULING ACTIONS,
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, REGULATED CHEMICALS 4 (2010), available at
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/orangebook/orangebook.pdf (providing
a list of scheduled chemicals); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 n.1
(2007) (noting that methylenedioxymethamphetamine is popularly called “MDMA”
or ecstasy). Schedule II drugs are likely to be abused and may cause the user to
become psychologically or physically dependent on the drug but have an accepted
medical purpose. 84 Stat. at 1247. Methamphetamine is currently a schedule II
drug. Id. at 1250.
35
Raich, 545 U.S. at 14–15; see also Perez et al., supra note 19, at 373
(explaining that the CSA is complete with a “review mechanism” that provides for
the introduction of new drugs or the reorganization of the current schedules).
36
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-609, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
37
Remarks on Signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1521, 1522 (Nov. 18, 1988) (noting the necessity of the Act by explaining
that “[a]rrests, convictions, and prison sentences” of those who sold and abused
drugs had risen to unparalleled levels).
38
Id. at 1523 (explaining that the ultimate goal of the Act was to make America
drug-free).
39
134 CONG. REC. 32632 (1988) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
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those involved in drug trafficking, warning them that the United
States would no longer allow their behavior to continue.40 The
legislation strengthened America’s law enforcement abilities,
bolstered its interdiction capabilities, strengthened its effort to
obliterate drug crops, and imposed more stringent penalties for
possession and trafficking.41
Section 401(d) of the CSA, which was later codified as
21 U.S.C. § 841(c),42 was amended twice throughout the
congressional proceedings and debates that surrounded this 1988
Act.43 The first amendment read:
Section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 841)
is amended by striking out subsection (d) and inserting in lieu
thereof the following new subsections: (d) Any person who
knowingly or intentionally . . . (2) possesses or distributes a
listed chemical knowing that the listed chemical will be used to
manufacture a controlled substance . . . .44

Section 401 was again amended eight days later to read as
it does today:
“(d) Any person who knowingly or
intentionally . . . (2) possesses or distributes a listed chemical
knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the listed
chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled
substance . . . .”45
40
Id. (summarizing the message as follows: “Don’t do drugs. This country will no
longer tolerate it”).
41
Id.
42
Until 2000, the present day 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was designated as
21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2). See infra note 45.
43
See 134 CONG. REC. 30,365 (1988) (proposing that the statutory language of
21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2) include “knowingly”); 134 CONG. REC. 33,191 (1988) (proposing,
eight days later, that “having reasonable cause to believe” should also be included in
the language).
44
134 CONG. REC. 30,365 (1988) (emphasis added).
45
134
CONG. REC.
33,191
(1988) (emphasis
added);
see
also
21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2) (West 2011). Listed chemicals include precursor chemicals to
controlled substances, such as methamphetamine and ecstasy. Such precursor
chemicals include pseudoephedrine, red phosphorous, iodine, ethyl ether, acetic
anhydride, and 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.02 (2010);
see also Oregon.gov, Clandestine Drug Lab Program, Chemicals Used in
Methamphetamine Manufacture, http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/druglab/chemicals.
shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (noting that pseudoephedrine, red phosphorous,
iodine, ethyl ether, and acetic anhydride are precursors to methamphetamine);
AbsoluteAstronomy, MDP2P, http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/MDP2P
(last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (stating that 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone is a
precursor to ecstasy). In 2000, Congress amended section 401 of the Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841, “by redesignating subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) as
subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively,” without altering the statutory
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II. THE COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF 21 U.S.C. § 841(C)(2)
Whenever the government seeks to prosecute a defendant for
an alleged crime, the government has the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the
requisite mens rea.46 For one to be found guilty of violating
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant knew or had reasonable cause to
believe that the chemical he distributed would be used to make a
controlled substance.47 Currently, the circuits are split regarding
the meaning of the mens rea.48 While the Tenth Circuit has held
that the statute requires the defendant to have subjective
knowledge that the chemical would be used to manufacture a
prohibited narcotic,49 the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
have held that evidence of either actual knowledge or that a
reasonable person in the defendant’s place would have known
that the chemical would be used to produce a controlled
substance is sufficient.50 The Seventh Circuit has failed to
establish a conclusive standard.51
language. Hillory J. Farias and Samantha Reid Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act of
2000, H.R. 2130, 106th Cong. § 9 (2000) (noting that the amendment was
“technical”).
46
See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 738 (2006) (explaining that a criminal
defendant is presumed innocent until the prosecution proves each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the defendant satisfied the
statute’s mens rea requirement).
47
21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2).
48
United States v. Khattab, 536 F.3d 765, 768–69 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that
there is a split amongst the circuits regarding the interpretation of “knowing or
having reasonable cause to believe”).
49
See United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) is wholly subjective); United
States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1268–69 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that
determining whether one has “reasonable cause to believe” is contingent upon the
defendant’s actual knowledge).
50
See United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that
“reasonable cause to believe” may be satisfied by either the defendant’s subjective or
objective knowledge); United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004)
(noting that “reasonable cause to believe” does not require actual knowledge but,
instead, an inquiry into the mind of the reasonable person in the defendant’s
situation); United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) allows the
government to prove that the defendant had either subjective or objective
knowledge).
51
See Khattab, 536 F.3d at 769 (explaining that the Seventh Circuit did not
adopt either interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)’s mens rea requirement because
the defendant’s actual knowledge made him guilty under either interpretation).
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This Part explores the varying interpretations of
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)’s requisite mens rea. Section A discusses
the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation. Section B explores how the
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted the mens
rea requirement. Finally, Section C discusses the Seventh
Circuit’s decision to not adopt a stance on the issue.
A.

A Court That Applies a Wholly Subjective Standard

In United States v. Saffo,52 the Tenth Circuit ruled that the
mens rea of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was entirely subjective,
requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant possessed
actual knowledge.
In Saffo, the defendant routinely sold
pseudoephedrine to various wholesale distributors in several
states;53 she was charged with, and convicted of, seven counts of
pseudoephedrine
distribution
in
violation
of
21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2).54 While Saffo admitted to selling large
quantities of pseudoephedrine, she denied knowing that her
purchasers planned on using the chemicals to manufacture
methamphetamine.55 The court held that “having reasonable
cause to believe” requires the government to prove something
“akin to actual knowledge,” noting that a conviction should be
based on the defendant’s guilty mind and not on the guilt of a
hypothetical reasonable man.56 The court further explained that
because “guilt is personal,” allowing a conviction based on the
knowledge of the theoretical reasonable man would essentially be
holding the defendant guilty under a negligence standard.57
Saffo, however, was found to have actual knowledge because she
had received a DEA “Red Notice” form that explained that
pseudoephedrine is typically used in methamphetamine
production and because drivers stopped with large quantities of
pseudoephedrine were carrying her name and telephone
number.58 Thus, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s
52

227 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1263–66.
54
Id. at 1267. Saffo was charged and convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2),
which was re-designated 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) when Congress enacted the Hillory J.
Farias and Samantha Reid Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act of 2000. See supra note
45.
55
See Saffo, 227 F.3d at 1272.
56
Id. at 1269.
57
See id.
58
See id. at 1270.
53
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conviction,59 holding that “knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe” is based solely on defendant’s subjective knowledge.60
Five years later, in United States v. Truong,61 the Tenth
Circuit, following Saffo, rejected the contention that the mens rea
requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) allowed proof of either the
defendant’s subjective or objective knowledge regarding his
purchaser’s intent to manufacture a controlled substance.62 In
Truong, the defendant, an employee at a Texaco gas station,
repeatedly sold large quantities of pseudoephedrine63 but
explained to the police that he did not know what would be done
with the pills once he sold them.64 The court noted that the sales
occurred “under unusual circumstances”—the defendant only
accepted cash for the transactions, ensured that sales only
occurred once the gas station was closed, placed the
pseudoephedrine in a closed Styrofoam cup, and did not ring the
sales into the cash register.65 The jury found the defendant
guilty, and he appealed his conviction.66 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit held that “knowing or reasonable cause to believe” is a
wholly subjective standard, requiring the government to prove
that the defendant actually knew the chemicals he distributed
would be used to manufacture a controlled substance—in this
case, methamphetamine.67 Relying on Saffo, the court reversed
the defendant’s conviction.68
The court found that the
government presented enough evidence to prove that the
defendant knew his customers “were up to no good” but failed to

59

Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1268.
61
425 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2005).
62
See id. at 1289; see also United States v. Buonocore, 416 F.3d 1124, 1133
(2005) (holding that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) requires a
wholly subjective inquiry and a conviction cannot be predicated upon the knowledge
of a reasonable man in the defendant’s situation).
63
Truong, 425 F.3d at 1284–85.
64
Id. at 1285.
65
Id. at 1286.
66
Id. at 1288.
67
Id. at 1289. The Court noted that the actual knowledge threshold may also be
satisfied if the prosecution proves that the defendant had “something close” to
subjective knowledge. Id.
68
Id. at 1291.
60
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prove that he had actual knowledge of their specific intention to
manufacture methamphetamine; therefore, the defendant did not
satisfy the mens rea requirement.69
B.

Courts That Apply a Mixed Subjective/Objective Standard

1.

The Eighth Circuit

The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the Tenth Circuit, ruling
that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) permitted
evidence of either the defendant’s actual knowledge or the
knowledge of a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation.70
In United States v. Galvan,71 officers monitoring the activity
inside a Wal-Mart store observed the defendant purchasing three
boxes of pseudoephedrine pills—the maximum amount one is
allowed to purchase.72 The officers then followed the defendant
to six other stores and watched as he left each store with a bag in
hand.73 The defendant was arrested.74 Inside the defendant’s
vehicle, the officers found two additional boxes of
pseudoephedrine pills, as well as a number of pills hidden in a
bag underneath the floorboard.75 In the district court, the
defendant was convicted of one count of violating
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).76 Galvan did not deny his possession of
pseudoephedrine but contended that the jury should be
instructed that the statute requires actual knowledge.77 On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not err

69
Id. at 1290–91. Other cases illustrate situations in which the defendant was
deemed to have had actual knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Buonocore, 416
F.3d 1124, 1126 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant had actual knowledge
because a recording disclosed the purchaser saying to the defendant, “the meth
cooks must be cookin like crazy . . . I must have had a run, there’s a bunch of meth
cooks in town, that’s what their [sic] using them for.”); United States v. Nguyen, 413
F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant had actual knowledge
because he received a DEA “Red Notice,” warning him that pseudoephedrine is often
used in methamphetamine manufacturing, and a DEA agent expressly told
defendant that “persons seeking to purchase large quantities of pseudoephedrine
should be a ‘red flag’ for criminal activity”).
70
United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005).
71
407 F.3d 954.
72
Id. at 955.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 957.
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in rejecting defendant’s proposed jury instructions.78
The
defendant’s proffered jury instructions stated that having
“reasonable cause to believe” requires the prosecution to prove
the defendant’s subjective knowledge.79 The court rejected this
instruction as erroneous, explaining that this interpretation of
the statute’s mens rea requirement would render the “reasonable
cause to believe” clause superfluous.80 The Eighth Circuit ruled
that the district court was correct in interpreting the statute to
avoid such redundancy and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.81
2.

The Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Eighth Circuit, holding
that a defendant must only have knowledge that would cause a
reasonable person in his situation to conclude that the chemicals
he sold would be used to manufacture a controlled substance.82
In United States v. Kaur,83 an undercover DEA agent purchased
a large amount of pseudoephedrine from defendant’s convenience
store and, as a result, the defendant was charged with violating
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).84 The defendant was convicted after the
district court instructed the jury that “reasonable cause to
believe” does not equate to actual knowledge but rather allows
the government to prove that a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would have been aware that the
pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture a controlled
substance.85 The Ninth Circuit upheld these jury instructions,
stating that if “reasonable cause to believe” required the
government to prove actual knowledge, having both “knowing”
and “having reasonable cause to believe” clauses in the statute
would be redundant.86
The court further explained that
interpretations that cause statutory language to be excessive
should be avoided.87 The Ninth Circuit adhered to this rule,
78

Id.
Id.
80
Id.; see also infra Part III.B.2.
81
Galvan, 407 F.3d at 957.
82
See United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2004).
83
382 F.3d 1155.
84
Id. at 1156.
85
Id. at 1157.
86
Id.; see also infra Part III.B.2.
87
Kaur, 382 F.3d at 1157 (“[C]ourts should disfavor interpretations of statutes
that render language superfluous.” (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253 (1992))).
79
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holding that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)
involves both a subjective and objective inquiry, and “having
reasonable cause to believe” is a distinct mens rea that differs
from actual knowledge.88
3.

The Eleventh Circuit

The Eleventh Circuit concurred with the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits.89 In United States v. Prather,90 the defendant sold large
quantities of pseudoephedrine through the mail; typically, he
sold cases of seventy-five 1,000-tablet bottles at a time to
individuals and stores providing drug paraphernalia.91 In 1995,
the defendant received a letter from a law firm explaining that
his high-risk activities may result in a criminal prosecution, yet
he failed to close down his mail-order business.92 The defendant
was convicted of ten counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2).93
On appeal, the defendant’s district court conviction was upheld,
even though the government did not prove that the defendant
had actual knowledge that the pseudoephedrine he sold would be
used to manufacture methamphetamine.94 The district court
judge explained to the jury, “the focus is not on what it is proven
that [the defendant] actually knew. Here the standard is[,] based
on what he did know, would a reasonable person . . . have cause
to believe that the pseudoephedrine in the count would be
diverted.”95 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and
held that the jury instructions were not erroneous, indicating
that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) does not
compel the government to prove actual knowledge.96
C.

An Undecided Court

In United States v. Khattab,97 the Seventh Circuit noted the
split amongst its sister courts regarding the “knowing or having
88

Id.
See United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000).
90
205 F.3d 1265.
91
Id. at 1268.
92
Id.
93
Id. Prather was charged and convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2). See supra
note 45.
94
See Prather, 205 F.3d at 1271.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
536 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2008).
89
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reasonable cause to believe” mens rea of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).98
In Khattab, the defendant unknowingly engaged in a series of
negotiations with undercover DEA agents to purchase l00 boxes
of pseudoephedrine from them.99
Each conversation was
recorded, and in one instance, the agent mentioned using the
pseudoephedrine to make a different substance; the defendant
explained that those who use the “narcotic substance” created
from the pseudoephedrine “sniff it” or “mix it with the baking
soda.”100 When the defendant met the undercover agents to
purchase the pseudoephedrine, the DEA agents identified
themselves, and the defendant was arrested.101 The defendant
was tried and convicted of one count of violating
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), and the district court held that the
prosecution’s evidence was “just barely” satisfactory to prove that
the defendant knew his purchasers would use the
On
pseudoephedrine to manufacture methamphetamine.102
appeal, the defendant argued the evidence presented against him
was not sufficient to prove actual knowledge.103 The Seventh
Circuit, albeit mentioning the existence of the circuit split
discussed above, failed to adopt an interpretation of the statute’s
mens rea requirement. Rather, the court held that the defendant
had genuine knowledge that the pseudoephedrine he sold would
be used to produce methamphetamine. The court commented
that because the defendant’s actual knowledge would have made
him guilty under either of the conflicting constructions, the case
at bar was “not the proper vehicle for [it] to weigh in on the
circuit split regarding the proper mens rea standard for
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).”104
III. 21 U.S.C. § 841(C)(2) SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A MIXED
SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE STANDARD
This Part maintains that various canons of statutory
interpretation confirm the view that the mens rea requirement of
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) should be construed as a mixed

98

Id. at 768–69.
Id. at 766.
100
Id. at 767.
101
Id. at 766.
102
Id. at 768.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 769.
99
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subjective/objective standard.
Section A provides a brief
description of the function of mens rea in criminal law and
outlines the differences between a subjective and objective
standard of guilt.
Section B explores different canons of
statutory construction and explains why each supports a mixed
standard. Finally, Section C outlines and counters the argument
made by proponents of a wholly subjective standard.
A.

Mens Rea

In American criminal jurisprudence, a crime consists of two
distinct elements: the actus reus, a physical act or omission, and
the mens rea, the defendant’s mental state.105 Determining the
defendant’s menal state is essential for conviction; the American
legal system holds steadfast to the belief that one must not be
convicted for purely accidental acts.106 While certain crimes
require that the government prove guilt by inquiring into the
defendant’s psyche and determining that his illegal act was
accompanied by an evil mind,107 other crimes allow conviction
based on a showing of objective fault.108 Objective fault requires
that the prosecution prove what a reasonably prudent person in
the defendant’s situation would have known or how he would
have acted,109 while a requirement of subjective fault necessitates
that the prosecution prove what the defendant himself actually
knew or did.110
No matter the mens rea standard, the

105

DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 127.
See United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952) (explaining that
an injury can only be a crime if the actor had a culpable mindset when committing
the act); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2 (2009) (1881)
(noting that “even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
kicked,” to explain that one should not be prosecuted for a mere accident).
107
See Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 436 (1982) (using murder as an
example of a crime that requires the government to prove that the defendant’s guilty
hand was accompanied by a guilty mind).
108
DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 275–76 (discussing that, occasionally, a
defendant’s conduct is viewed from an objective point of view).
109
See id. at 275 (explaining that the “reasonable man” governs objectivity in
the criminal law).
110
See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 340 (2000) (categorizing “actual”
and “subjective” as one in the same).
106

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1099 (2010)

2010]

HOW MUCH DO YOU REALLY HAVE TO KNOW?

1115

prosecution in a criminal trial always has the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the
requisite mental state.111
Statutory crimes typically employ certain words to articulate
the mens rea requirement. Common terms include intentionally,
knowingly, willfully, recklessly, and negligently;112 each requires
that the prosecution prove something different to achieve a
conviction.
Although these words and their accompanying
definitions are not uniform throughout American jurisdictions,113
the Model Penal Code provides definitions that are widely
accepted.114 Under the Model Penal Code, “knowingly” requires
the prosecution to prove the defendant’s subjective fault—that he
was nearly certain that a particular result would occur.115 In
contrast, the phrase “having reasonable cause to believe” is not
defined in the Model Penal Code.116 The circuit split highlights
the fact that perhaps this mens rea is not as clear as
“knowingly.”117
B.

Statutory Interpretation

1.

The Plain Meaning Rule

When Congress does not explicitly define the words or
phrases it uses in a statute, one must look to established canons
of statutory interpretation. To determine the plain meaning of a
111

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 738 (2006) (explaining that in a criminal trial,
the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant satisfied the statute’s mens rea requirement).
112
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 129–44 (5th ed.
2006) (listing and explaining oft-used mens rea words).
113
See DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 160 (noting that there are “countless” mens
rea expressions used across different jurisdictions).
114
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2001) (defining the requirements for culpability
under “purposely,” “knowingly,” “recklessly,” and “negligently” mens reas).
115
Id. § 2.02(2)(b).
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct,
he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a
result.
Id.
116
See id. § 2.02.
117
See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (discussing the debate
amongst the circuits regarding whether the mens rea “having reasonable cause to
believe” requires subjective or objective knowledge).
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statute, the first step is to examine the language of the statute
itself.118 If the statutory language plainly and unequivocally
establishes its meaning, looking beyond this language is
unnecessary.119 However, if the language of the statute is
unclear or ambiguous and thus, fails to plainly establish its
meaning, one must turn to the legislative history of the
statute.120 The Supreme Court has frequently followed this plain
language rule, explaining that if the wording of a statute has a
clear and unambiguous definition, courts need not look further
than the statute’s language to discern its meaning.121
Dictionaries are a key tool in discerning the plain meaning of
words or phrases used in a statute.122 The dictionary definitions
of the word “or” provide keen insight regarding the correct
interpretation of “knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “or” as “a disjunctive
particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one
among two or more things . . . .
[A]n alternative between
different or unlike things.”123 Similarly, Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary describes “or” as “used as a function word
to indicate an alternative.”124 The plain meaning of the word “or”
118
See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681, 685 (2009) (discussing that
statutory interpretation always begins with the ordinary meaning of the language);
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“When the words of a
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is
complete.’ ”).
119
See Germain, 503 U.S. at 253–54; see also United States v. One “Piper” Aztec
“F” De Luxe Model 250 PA 23 Aircraft Bearing Serial No. 27-7654057, 321 F.3d 355,
359 (3d Cir. 2003) (determining that when Congress’s purpose is expressed in
unambiguous terms, that language is conclusive).
120
See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (noting that the
Supreme Court does “not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is
clear”).
121
See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1063–64 (2009) (“[W]e must
first determine whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous. If it is, we
must apply the statute according to its terms.” (internal citations omitted)); Gitlitz v.
Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206, 220 (2001) (noting that when the statute’s language is plain,
resort to policy analysis is unnecessary); Comm’r v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174
(1993) (explaining that the first step in statutory interpretation is to look to the
ordinary meaning of the language); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 241 (1989) (“The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute]
begins where all such inquires must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”).
122
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 216–17, 219 (2002) (using a dictionary to
determine the plain meaning of “pending” when attempting to interpret
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2006)).
123
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (6th ed. 1990).
124
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 872 (11th ed. 2007).
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unambiguously demonstrates that when it is placed between two
words or phrases, it is used to indicate different, independent
concepts.125
These definitions of the word “or” support the position that
“having reasonable cause to believe” should not be interpreted
similarly to “knowingly.” Instead, it should be interpreted as an
unlike, different standard—the objective standard.
The
disjunctive term is a signal that implies that only one of the
enumerated requirements must be fulfilled and additionally, that
the listed terms have distinct meanings.126
Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), if “having reasonable cause to
believe” is the same as “knowing,” then no diversity exists
between the terms before and after “or,” since both “knowing”
and “having reasonable cause to believe” will require the
government to prove the defendant’s subjective knowledge. This
interpretation runs counter to the ordinary dictionary meanings
of “or.” If Congress intended the statute to have only one,
subjective mens rea requirement, “or” would not have been the
appropriate word choice; instead, “and” would have been used to
signify that both mentes reae necessitate subjective fault. “And”
is typically understood as indicating that the listed requirements
are of the same type.127 To ensure that the plain meaning of the
statutory language is effectuated, “knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe” must be interpreted as allowing a conviction
based on subjective awareness or, in the alternative, a
defendant’s objective knowledge.
a.

Legislative Intent

The legislative intent of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) also
demonstrates that Congress purposely armed the statute with
two distinct mentes reae. When interpreting the language of a
statute, a court may attempt to decipher what the legislature
125
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739–40 (1978) (explaining that
when a list of words are written in the disjunctive, it is implied that each has a
different meaning); YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 8 (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (discussing that “or” is used to
demonstrate the existence of an alternative).
126
KIM, supra note 125.
127
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 124, at 46
(defining “and” as “used as a function word to indicate connection or addition . . . of
items within the same class or type”).
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planned to accomplish when it decided to enact the statute.128
The congressional proceedings and debates surrounding the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, and specifically 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2),
shed light on Congress’s goals.
During the proceedings,
Representative Kolbe explained that due to the stark increase in
drug use in America, more rigorous law enforcement measures
were needed to control drug production and manufacturing
throughout the country.129 The Act was drafted to serve that
purpose by substantially enhancing the government’s ability to
control the transportation of precursor chemicals that are used to
manufacture illicit drugs, such as methamphetamine.130
Similarly, Senator Dole noted that one-hundred percent of
illegally-used methamphetamine is manufactured in the United
States, and the Act would provide the government with the tools
necessary to combat and eradicate methamphetamine production
and use.131 Moreover, Representative Manton explained that the
legislation increased the amount of resources available to
prosecute and convict people for drug-related offenses and
allowed the government to strictly scrutinize the distribution of
legal chemicals that are used to manufacture illicit narcotics.132
Senator Rudman echoed this statement, describing the Act as a

128
See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 512, 515 (1990) (referring to the
Senate report to determine the “primary objective” of various amendments to the
Medicaid law); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389 U.S. 463, 468
(1968) (noting that interpreting a statute in light of its legislative history and
general objectives facilitates a proper construction).
129
See 134 CONG. REC. 22,637 (1988) (statement of Rep. Kolbe).
130
See id. at 22,618 (statement of Rep. English) (noting that the bill would
provide the government with more tools to stop the diversion of chemicals from
legitimate enterprises into illegal channels); id. at 22,650 (statement of Rep. Bates)
(noting that the bill would enhance the government’s control over precursor
chemicals to methamphetamine).
131
See 134 CONG. REC. 32,634 (1988) (statement of Sen. Dole).
132
See id. at 22,646 (statement of Rep. Manton). Rep. Manton stated:
[T]his legislation will supplement our previous anti-drug efforts by
strengthening existing law and providing new resources in our fight
against drugs . . . . [W]e will finally place controls on many of those
chemicals commonly available which are used in the manufacturing and
processing of illegal narcotics . . . [,] increase our assistance to State and
local drug enforcement by increasing their overall authorization . . . [, and]
broaden the jurisdiction of several branches of the Federal Government to
play a wider role in drug enforcement.
Id.
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“major new effort” that would prevent legal precursor chemicals
from being diverted to channels of illicit drug production.133
The congressional records clearly suggest that a major facet
of the bill was to stop legal chemicals from being used for illicit
purposes—namely, narcotic production—in an attempt to ensure
the safety of the United States.134 Members of Congress often
discussed increasing the number of resources available to the
government to combat drug manufacturing and use.
By
providing two different mens rea requirements to satisfy a
conviction, the Act does just that. Allowing the prosecution to
prove guilt on one of two bases widens the scope of criminal
liability by criminalizing not only subjective knowledge but also
objective awareness that the chemicals one distributes will be
used to manufacture a controlled substance. Additionally, the
legislation was aimed at eradicating drug manufacturing,
distribution, and use in America, as affirmed by President
Reagan in his remarks on signing the Act.135 The President
discussed “clos[ing] rank on those who continue to provide drugs”
by strengthening the government’s power and ability “to
eliminate from America’s streets and towns the scourge of illicit
drugs.”136 If 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) is interpreted as requiring
subjective knowledge, the government is unable to “close rank”
on those who fail to take notice of the obviousness of their
actions, when the reasonably prudent person would have known
the chemicals would be used to produce a controlled substance.
Construing the statute to contain two distinct mens rea
requirements effectuates the goal of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988—eliminating illegal drugs in the United States.

133

134 CONG. REC. 32,630–31 (1988) (statement of Sen. Rudman).
See id. at 32,630 (statement of Sen. Rudman) (noting that the drug problem
in America was “one of the most serious threats” to national security, and the Act
would serve to restore safety to the United States by diminishing drug production
and use); id. at 32,636 (statement of Sen. Chiles) (discussing the grave threat that
drugs posed to the security of the United States).
135
Remarks on Signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, at 1522–
23 (describing the “ultimate destination” of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 as
making America drug free).
136
Id.
134
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The sequence of changes in the statutory language that
occurred throughout congressional proceedings is also telling.137
As a general matter, the Supreme Court attaches significance to
Congress’s choice to use one House’s proposed version of a
statute’s language over another House’s model.138 For example,
in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court found
Congress’s choice of the Senate’s proposed definition of
“navigable waters” and rejection of the House’s extremely
persuasive for determining how the Clean Water Act should be
Here,
the
statutory
language
of
interpreted.139
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) underwent two significant changes
throughout the legislative process.140 The Senate’s first proposed
amendment to 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) included only one mens rea
requirement: knowing.141 The House proposed to amend the
Senate’s language on October 21, 1988 and added “reasonable
cause to believe” as a second mens rea.142 Congress chose to
adopt the House’s version. When 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was
enacted, both terms appeared in the statute.143 Similar to
Riverside, here Congress had the opportunity to choose between
two varying drafts of the amendment to 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2),
and it decided to enact the House’s version. This final version
indicates Congress’s intent to expand the reach of the statute
past the scope originally proposed in the Senate’s amendment.144
If “knowing” and “having reasonable cause to believe” both meant
137

See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739–41 (2001) (examining changes to the
language of a bill as a tool in statutory construction); United States v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222 (1952) (looking to the “specific history of the
legislative process” of a statute aids in arriving at an appropriate meaning).
138
See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 136–37 (1985).
139
See id. at 137.
140
See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
141
134 CONG. REC. S15,785 (daily ed. Oct 13, 1988). The proposed amendment
read:
Section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841) is amended by
striking out subsection (d) and inserting in lieu thereof the following new
subsections:
(d) Any
person
who
knowingly
or
intentionally . . . (2) possesses or distributes a listed chemical knowing that
the listed chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled substance . . . .
Id.
142
134 CONG. REC. H11108 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
143
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6055, 102 Stat. 4181,
4318 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2) (West 2011)).
144
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258–59 (2004)
(“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to
have real and substantial effect.” (quoting Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995))).
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actual knowledge, the amendment would have lacked meaning,
been duplicative, and served no cogent purpose. Congress,
however, always intends its statutory amendments to be
substantive and significant.145 Congress’s decision to adopt the
House’s proposed amendment over the Senate’s, coupled with
this fact about statutory amendments, support the conclusion
that Congress intended “knowing” and “having reasonable cause
to believe” to be independent, alternate mentes reae.
b.

“Having Reasonable Cause To Believe” Is a Term of Art

When attempting to decipher the meaning of a particular
statute, courts also consider whether Congress has explicitly
defined the term or phrase.146 When a word or phrase has been
defined elsewhere in the United States Code, it becomes a “term
Unless circumstances indicate otherwise, that
of art.”147
definition is controlling.148 The Supreme Court has noted that if
applying the definition to the statute at hand would present an
“obvious incongruit[y]” or depart from the statute’s purpose, then
the circumstances indicate that definition is not controlling.149
Currently, “reasonable cause to believe” is defined in
12 U.S.C. § 4003(c)(1) as requiring “the existence of facts which
would cause a well-grounded belief in the mind of a reasonable
person.”150 Here, no perverse implications would result from
defining the same phrase in 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) in the same
manner. Title 12, section 4003(c)(1) was codified in 1987; thus,
Congress arguably knew how it had previously defined
“reasonable cause to believe” when it decided to use that same
language in 1988.151 With this knowledge, Congress decidedly
employed
the
term
when
drafting
and
enacting
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).

145

See id.
See KIM, supra note 125, at 5.
147
See id. at 5–6 (noting that when Congress has previously defined a word or
phrase in a section of the United States Code, that word or phrase is a “term of art”).
148
See id. (explaining that when a term is defined in the United States Code,
that definition is to be applied when the word or phrase is used elsewhere in the
Code, so long as the definition is applicable in the circumstances).
149
Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949).
150
12 U.S.C. § 4003(c)(1) (2006); see also Fort v. Smith, 407 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980) (identifying “reasonable cause to believe” as a term of art).
151
See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 496 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (noting that it is safe
to assume that Congress was cognizant of existing law when enacting legislation).
146
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Statutory Language Should Not Be Construed To Render
Any Part Superfluous

The maxim that courts should avoid interpretations that
render any part of the statutory language superfluous has
remained constant from the nineteenth century until today.152
This rule of statutory interpretation serves an even more
important purpose when interpreting a criminal statute. As the
Supreme Court noted in Ratzlaf v. United States,153 judges should
be even more reluctant to treat statutory language as mere
surplusage when the words are defining an element of a criminal
offense.154 In Bailey v. United States,155 the Supreme Court
explained that when Congress places two terms in a statute, it
assumes that Congress intended each word to have its own
“nonsuperfluous” meaning.156
Ensuring that a statute is
construed to avoid rendering any part of the statute superfluous
is well-established in the Supreme Court.157
Here, if “reasonable cause to believe” requires actual
knowledge, it is an entirely redundant, unnecessary phrase, as
“knowingly” already requires that the defendant have a
subjective awareness that the chemicals he distributes will be
used to manufacture a controlled substance.158 Similar to the

152
See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2009) (noting that
a statute should be construed in such a way that each provision is given a meaning
and no part of the statute will be insignificant); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (“[C]ourts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that
render language superfluous.”); Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S.
552, 562 (1990) (noting that courts should be extremely hesitant to interpret a
statute so as to make any words or provisions unnecessary); Montclair v. Ramdsell,
107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (stating that courts should “give effect, if possible, to every
clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies
that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed”).
153
510 U.S. 135 (1994).
154
See id. at 140–41 (explaining that judges should attempt to ensure that each
word in a statute has consequence, especially when the statute at hand is criminal).
155
516 U.S. 137 (1995).
156
Id. at 146 (noting that when Congress decided to use two different terms, it
did not intend for either term to be excessive).
157
See, e.g., Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)
(stating that “of course” the court attempts to interpret statutes so no word is
rendered unnecessary).
158
See United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining
that if having “reasonable cause to believe” requires subjective knowledge, the
phrase is superfluous and unnecessary); United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1157
(9th Cir. 2004) (noting that because “knowing” and “having reasonable cause to
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statute referenced in Bailey, we may presume that not only did
Congress purposely use two different phrases when drafting
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) but that the legislature intended each term
to have its own distinct meaning, especially since the statute
defines a criminal offense.159 Congress chose to adopt the latter
of the two language options. By using two different phrases in
the statute, Congress deliberately chose to broaden the
application of the statute beyond actual knowledge and provide
two different bases for conviction.160 If Congress intended to
provide the government with only one avenue for conviction, it
would have, and could have, written the statute to ensure such a
construction; instead, Congress worded the statute to plainly
present “knowing” and “having reasonable cause to believe” as
two individual, separate alternatives.161
3.

Mischief Approach

Another tool often used in statutory interpretation is the
“mischief” approach, also commonly know as the “purposivist”
approach, which is considered the most flexible and traditional
method.162 Under this doctrine, a court first determines the ill
that the legislature was attempting to remedy by passing the
statute. Next, the statute is interpreted in a manner that
“attack[s] that mischief as manifested under current
circumstances.”163
This approach has been recognized for over four-hundred
years. In 1584, the English judge presiding over Heydon’s Case164
explained that “the office of all the Judges is always to make
such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance
believe” are obviously “two distinct alternatives,” having “reasonable cause to
believe” would be redundant if it is defined as actual knowledge).
159
See Bailey, 510 U.S. at 146 (“We assume that Congress used two terms
because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”); see
also Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140–41.
160
See Bailey, 510 U.S. at 146 (explaining that when Congress uses two different
terms in a statute, the language should be interpreted as allowing two independent
bases upon which the government may charge a defendant).
161
See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[C]ourts
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says there.”).
162
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 332 n.40 (1990).
163
Id. (citing Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory
Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1269–72 (1947)).
164
76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. 1584).
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the remedy” that “Parliament hath resolved and appointed to
cure the disease of the commonwealth.”165 The trend was still
dominant three-hundred years later.166 In United States v.
Boisdoré’s Heirs,167 Chief Justice Taney noted that judges must
always interpret a statute according to the policy that drove its
enactment.168 The Supreme Court has remained loyal to this
approach, noting time and time again that a statute should be
interpreted in a way that will remedy the harm that the
legislature sought to eradicate.169 The purposivist approach
instructs a court to consider how the particular mischief has
evolved since the statute’s enactment.170
When Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, it
consistently explained that the purpose of the legislation was to
ensure that drugs no longer ravaged the safety of the United
States. Senators Byrd and Rudman noted that the presence of
drugs in America was “one of the most serious threats” to the
country, and the Act’s purpose was to restore safety to the United
States by eradicating drug production, manufacturing, and
use.171 Senator Rockefeller detailed the deleterious effect drug

165

Id. at 639.
See, e.g., United States v. Boisdoré’s Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850).
167
49 U.S. (8 How.) 113.
168
See id. at 122 (“In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to
its object and policy.”).
169
See Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1171 (2009) (explaining that
“interpretation is a multifaceted enterprise” that includes construing statutory
language to effectuate the legislature’s policy); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S.
844, 845 (2005) (explaining that deciphering the “purpose” of a statute is a “staple”
of statutory interpretation); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443–48 (1988)
(noting that the “answer” to correctly interpreting a statute is in the purpose of the
act); United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26 (1982) (citing Nat’l
Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)); SEC v.
Joiner, 320 U.S. 344, 350–51 (1943) (noting that statutory text should be interpreted
to further the generally expressed legislative policy).
170
See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 162.
171
134 CONG. REC. S17,300-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statements of Sen. Byrd
and Sen. Rudman); see also id. (statement of Sen. McConnell) (explaining that the
bill sought to notify drug traffickers that the United States government would no
longer allow drugs to be the cause of innumerable deaths, and noting that the
legislation aimed to crack down on those who “finance” the enemy); id. (statement of
Sen. Chiles) (noting that drugs pose a serious threat to national security); 134 CONG.
REC. H7074-02 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1988) (statement of Rep. Hoyer) (commenting that
drugs are “tearing” apart the nation).
166
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use was having on the security of America’s family units and
economy, explaining that drugs cause a stark increase in
criminal activities. Senator Rockefeller stated,
[w]e have seen drugs literally rip thousands of American
families asunder. Nationally, substance abuse is a factor in 90
percent of all teen pregnancies, 60 percent of all teen suicides
and homicides, and 90 percent of all incest cases.
....
It is estimated that the economic costs associated with drug
abuse in the United States could be as high as $100 billion a
year in lost productivity, associated health care costs, and the
need for increased law enforcement.
....
The National Institute of Justice found that of 2,000 persons
arrested for serious crimes last year, 70 percent tested positive
for drug use. More than half of the criminal cases pending
before our courts involve drug-related crimes.172

Today, drugs also endanger the protection of the United
States via the relationship between drug trafficking and
international terrorism. In 1988, Representative Smith noted
that there was a “connection between narcotics traffickers and
terrorists,” yet the issue of narco-terrorism was not nearly as
prominent and glaring as it is today.173 Over the past two
decades, the connection between drug transactions and
international terrorism has significantly strengthened and poses
a genuine threat to the safety of the United States.174 When
Congress passed the Act, the ill that it sought to remedy was the
negative impact that drug trafficking had on the safety of the
nation. Today, in the wake of 9/11, the Madrid subway bombing,

172

134 CONG. REC. S17,301-01 (statement by Sen. Rockefeller).
134 CONG. REC. H7074-02 (statement by Rep. Smith); see also DAVEED
GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & KYLE DABRUZZI, CTR. FOR POLICING TERRORISM, THE
CONVERGENCE OF CRIME AND TERROR: LAW ENFORCEMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND
PERILS 2–4 (2007) (noting that “[t]errorist groups have derived a great deal of profit
from the illegal drug trade” and describing the relationship between
methamphetamine trafficking and the Shia terrorist group Hezbollah); David
Kaplan, Paying for Terror, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 5, 2005),
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051205/5terror.htm (describing the
connection between the Madrid subway bombing and MDMA trafficking).
174
See GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & DABRUZZI, supra note 173, at 3–5 (commenting on
the danger to the United States caused by the link between drug traffickers and
terrorists).
173
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and the rapid growth of international terrorist organizations
drugs specifically threaten the security of the United States by
financing the operation of terrorist groups.175
Former Attorney General John Ashcroft once stated,
“[t]errorism and drugs go together like rats and the bubonic
plague—they thrive in the same conditions, support each other,
and feed off each other.”176 A “narco-terrorist organization” is “an
organized group that is complicit in the activities of drug
trafficking in order to further, or fund, premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets
with the intention to influence.”177 Similarly, “narco-terrorism” is
the use of drug trafficking as a way to provide financial support
Currently, narco-terrorism is
to terrorist organizations.178
prevalent within the borders of the United States, as profits from
narcotics transactions are used to finance terrorist
organizations;179 twelve of the thirty-six organizations on the
State Department’s terrorist organizations list have been linked
to the international drug trade.180 Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and
Hamas each receive financing from narcotics trafficking in the
United States.181
Specifically, a strong connection between methamphetamine
trafficking and terrorist organizations has been uncovered within
the past decade.182 A study of jihadist terrorism since 9/11
175

See id. at 3–4.
John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, DEA/Drug Enforcement
Rollout (Mar. 19, 2002) (prepared remarks), available at http://www.justice.gov/
archive/ag/speeches/2002/031902newsconferencedeaenforcementrollout.htm.
President George W. Bush nearly echoed this sentiment, stating, “It’s so important
for Americans to know that the traffic in drugs finances the work of terror,
sustaining terrorists . . . . Terrorists use drug profits to fund their cells to commit
acts of murder.” RACHEL EHRENHELD, FUNDING EVIL: HOW TERRORISM IS FINANCED
AND HOW TO STOP IT 3–4 (2005).
177
GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & DABRUZZI, supra note 173, at 4.
178
Id.
179
Larry Cunningham, The Border Search Exception as Applied to Exit and
Export Searches: A Global Conceptualization, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 32 (2007).
180
Id. at 32–33; see also Sara Carter, Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into
U.S., WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the DEA believes that sixty
percent of terrorist groups are connected with illicit narcotics trafficking).
181
See EHRENFELD, supra note 176, at 12.
182
Methamphetamine is a schedule II controlled substance. U.S. Drug
Enforcement Admin., Methamphetamine, http://usdoj.gov/dea/concern/meth.html
(last visted Nov. 12, 2010). Methamphetamine is an addictive illegal stimulant that
may be snorted, smoked, or injected intravenously by users. See id. Common street
names for methamphetamine include, but are not limited to, “speed,” “meth,” “poor
176
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revealed that terrorist groups find financial support through
methamphetamine sales in the United States.183 In January
2002, Operation Mountain Express III, a federal investigation,
resulted in charges against 136 people, and the seizure of 179
pounds of methamphetamine and thirty-six tons of
pseudoephedrine,
a
listed
precursor
chemical
to
methamphetamine.184 A large portion of the profits from the
drug ring was sent to the Middle East to support terrorist
organizations.185 In thwarting yet another Hezbollah drug ring,
the DEA arrested 300 people for methamphetamine sales and
seized 181 pounds of methamphetamine, thirty tons of
pseudoephedrine, and nine methamphetamine laboratories.186
The DEA concluded that profits from this drug ring were being
used in support of the Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and Hamas terrorist
operations.187 Similarly, Operation Green Quest, a “task force on
terrorist financing” designed to destroy the financial sources of
terrorism,
uncovered
instances
of
proceeds
from
methamphetamine trafficking being sent to support Hezbollah.188
Furthermore, ecstasy trafficking is another source of funding
for terrorist groups.189 The Madrid Cell, the terrorist group that
man’s cocaine,” “crystal,” and “shabu.” Id. Methamphetamine highs may last for as
long as half a day and have toxic repercussions on the brain; high doses can cause
the body’s temperature to spike to lethal levels and may cause convulsions. See id.
Long-term use often causes addiction, violent behavior, anxiety, insomnia,
hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal tendencies, and depression. See id.
Methamphetamine recipes are readily available on the Internet, thereby allowing
anyone with Internet access the opportunity to learn how to manufacture the drug.
Simple Ways To Make Methamphetamine, http://www.simple-ways-to-makemethamphetamine.com/crank-meth-recipe-red-white-blue-process.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2010).
183
EHRENFELD, supra note 176.
184
GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & DABRUZZI, supra note 173, at 3.
185
Id.
186
See EHRENFELD, supra note 176, at 11–12; see also U.S. Drug Enforcement
Admin., Maps of Methamphetamine Lab Incidents, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
concern/map_lab_seizures.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (observing that since
January 1999, 123,400 methamphetamine labs have been seized).
187
EHRENFELD, supra note 176, at 12.
188
GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & DABRUZZI, supra note 173, at 3.
189
See Kaplan, supra note 173. Ecstasy, or MDMA, a schedule I controlled
substance, is an illegal drug that functions as a stimulant and a psychedelic. U.S.
Drug Enforcement Admin., MDMA (Ecstasy), http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/
mdma.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). Users experience euphoria, and reduced
inhibitions, heightened energy and sexuality, and distortions in time and perception.
See id. Street names include, but are not limited to, “XTC,” “E,” “X,” “hug drug,” and
“disco biscuit.” See id. Ecstasy use may cause liver, kidney, cardiovascular system

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1099 (2010)

1128

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1099

arranged the 2004 subway bombing in Madrid, received much of
its financing from the proceeds of ecstasy sales.190 The Cell’s
leaders called drug sales “a weapon of jihad.”191 The terrorist
gang financed the subway bombing with money earned from
trafficking in ecstasy. When police raided the home of a Madrid
Cell member, 125,800 ecstasy pills were seized.192
Currently, narcotics trafficking poses a substantial threat to
the safety of the United States, as terrorist organizations use the
profits of methamphetamine and ecstasy sales to finance
terrorist operations.193 Since the statute’s enactment in 1988, the
damage caused by controlled substances has evolved into
endangering the safety of the United States by way of narcoterrorist organizations.194 Pursuant to the mischief approach to
statutory construction, the “knowing or having reasonable cause
to believe” requisite mens rea of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) must be
interpreted with this threat in mind; specifically, it must be
construed in light of the recently-formed connection between
narcotics trafficking and international terrorism.195
Since
Congress passed 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) to diminish the threat that
controlled substances posed to the United States, its language
should be interpreted to further that objective.
To effectuate Congress’s intent to protect the country from
the danger of narcotics, the statute must be interpreted broadly.
If the statute is construed narrowly as a wholly subjective
standard, the government will be unable to safeguard the United
States from those who fail to take notice of the fact that the
chemicals they sell will be used to manufacture a controlled
substance, when the reasonable person in the defendant’s
position would have been aware of his purchaser’s intent.
Construing the statute to limit the government’s reach directly
interferes with the legislature’s intent—that is, to protect the
United States from terrorism by eliminating terrorist drug
money ties—by making an entire class of people often involved in
failure, muscle tension, nausea, blurred vision, faintness, depression, and trouble
concentrating. See id.
190
See Kaplan, supra note 173 (describing the connection between ecstasy sales
and the subway bombing).
191
GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & DABRUZZI, supra note 173, at 5.
192
Kaplan, supra note 173.
193
See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text.
194
See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text.
195
See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
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drug trafficking immume from convinction.
Alternatively,
interpreting the statute as a mixed subjective/objective standard
provides the government with two bases upon which it may
convict a defendant for drug trafficking. As a result, this will
enhance the government’s ability effectively thwart terrorist
activities by allowing the prosecution to convict a larger number
of dangerous criminals. This interpretation is consistent with
Congress’s attempt to safeguard the country from terrorism, a
substantial danger caused by narcotics.
C.

The Tenth Circuit’s Erroneous Counterargument

Proponents of an entirely subjective standard, namely the
Tenth Circuit, argue that one’s guilt cannot be predicated on the
beliefs of a hypothetical, reasonable man but instead must take
into account the precise knowledge of the defendant himself.196
The Tenth Circuit noted that “[g]uilt is personal,” and a
defendant cannot fairly be forced to accept liability simply
because a hypothetical person would have had knowledge of
certain facts.197 This view, however, is based on a flawed
perception of the criminal law. In fact, there are statutes that
criminalize actions without ever inquiring into the defendant’s
state of mind198 or by determining what a reasonable person in
the defendant’s situation would have known.199 A prime example
is statutory rape; the criminal law punishes a defendant for
engaging in intercourse with a child under a certain age,
regardless of whether the defendant thought or a reasonable
person would have thought the child was older than the requisite
age.200 The defendant’s mens rea is irrelevant to conviction,
proving that guilt certainly does not always require an
examination of the defendant’s actual, subjective knowledge.
Similarly, the negligence mens rea is widely used throughout the
criminal law. When employed, the negligence standard requires
only that a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would
have known certain facts or acted in a certain way.201 Criminally
196

See United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1268–69 (10th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1269.
198
See DRESSLER, supra note 112, at 156 (explaining that “strict liability” crimes
impose liability without a mens rea requirement).
199
See id. at 131 (noting that a negligence mens rea punishes a defendant “for
his failure to live up to the standards of the fictional ‘reasonable person’ ”).
200
See id. at 157–58.
201
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d).
197
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negligent homicide is one such example: To be convicted of this
crime, the Model Penal Code explains that the prosecution need
only prove that the defendant acted in contrast to how a
reasonable person would have acted in his situation.202 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit deviates from the well-established tenet in
criminal law jurisprudence that guilt does not always have to be
based upon the defendant’s subjective knowledge but in fact can
based on the knowledge of the reasonably prudent man.
CONCLUSION
The mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)—
“knowing or having reasonable cause to believe”—must be
interpreted to allow either subjective or objective proof as to the
mens rea of the defendant and calls upon the Supreme Court to
reverse the Tenth Circuit’s contrary opinion. The prosecution
may prove the defendant’s guilt either by demonstrating that he
had actual knowledge that the listed chemicals he distributed
would be used to manufacture a controlled substance or that a
reasonably prudent person in the defendant’s situation would
have had such an understanding. Congress enacted the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, which authorized the current language
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), to eradicate drug manufacturing and use
in America and focused on providing the government with the
necessary resources to stop legal drugs from being used to
manufacture illicit substances. Congress intended to ensure the
safety of the United States by waging an aggressive attack on
those who supply and use drugs. The proposed interpretation,
already adopted by the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, is
overwhelmingly supported by the legislative history of the
statute, the canon of statutory interpretation that holds that no
language in a statute should be rendered superfluous, and the
“mischief approach” to statutory construction. Each of these
fundamental tools, used regularly by the Supreme Court,
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering
the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor’s situation.
Id. (emphasis added).
202
See id. § 210.4.
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convincingly confirm that “knowing or having reasonable cause
to believe” must be understood as allowing a conviction based on
the defendant’s subjective or objective knowledge. The Supreme
Court should resolve the circuit split and adopt the correct
interpretation
of
the
mens
rea
requirement
of
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2): a mixed subjective/objective standard.

